The Logical Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability under Oklahoma\u27s Workers\u27 Compensation Law by Carmody, William Christopher
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 23 Issue 3 
Spring 1988 
The Logical Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability under 
Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Law 
William Christopher Carmody 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William C. Carmody, The Logical Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability under Oklahoma's Workers' 
Compensation Law, 23 Tulsa L. J. 461 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/4 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
THE LOGICAL RECOGNITION OF GRADUAL
STRESS DISABILITY UNDER OKLAHOMA'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing courts administering
workers' compensation is the compensation of gradual stress disability.'
The causal relationship between employment stress and a resulting
mental disability presents one of the most complex issues in workers'
1. Gradual stress disabiltiy is a mental disability resulting from the gradual stress of employ-
ment. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
The topic of gradual stress disability has received extensive commentary. See Dahl, The Inter-
Relationship Between Law and Medicine in Workmen's Compensation: A Comparative Guide for
Practitioners, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 25 (1975); Joseph, Causation in Workers' Compensation Mental
Disability Cases: The Michigan Experience, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1079 (1981); LaDou, Mulryan &
McCarthy, Cumulative Injury or Disease Claims: An Attempt to Define Employers' Liability for
Workers' Compensation, 6 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1980); Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Work-
men's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1243 (1970); Lasky, Psychiatry and California Workers'
Compensation Laws: A Threat and A Challenge, 17 CAL. W. L. Rtv. 1 (1980); Levine, Legal Ques-
tions Regarding the Causation of Occupational Disease, 26 LAB. L.J. 88, 104-06 (1975); Loria, The
Mind is the Matter, 53 J. URB. L. 895 (1976); Manson, Workmen's Compensation and the Disabling
Neurosis, II BUFFALO L. REv. 376 (1962); Render, Mental Illness as an Industrial Accident, 31
TENN. L. REV. 288 (1964); Selzer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 951, 954-56, 961 (1971); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA.
L. REV. 87, 138-49 (1943); Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the Alco-
holic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination Under Federal and State Employ-
ment Statutes and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 659, 711-18 (1979); Comment,
Recovery for Nervous Injury Resulting from Mental Stimulus Under Workmen's Compensation Laws,
53 CHL[-]KENT L. REv. 731 (1977); Note, Emotional Stress--Now a Cause of Compensable Injury?
34 LA. L. REv. 846 (1974); Note, When Stress Becomes Distress: Mental Disabilities Under Workers'
Compensation in Massachusetts, 15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 287 (1980); Comment, Workmen's Compen-
sation-Compensability of Mental Injury--In re Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay, & Curr Co., 21 N.Y.L.F.
465 (1976); Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Diseases Arising Out of Employment-A Problem
of Proof, 2 PAC. L.J. 678 (1971); Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual Stress in the Work-
place, 133 U. PA. L. RPv. 847 (1985); Note, Nervous Disabilities Induced by Repetitious Mental
Trauma Held Noncompensable: Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn, 33 Sw. L.J. 905 (1979);
Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Accidental Injuries Arising Out of Employment, 39 TENN. L.
REv. 366 (1972); Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Recovery for Mental Injury Caused by
Mental Impact, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 552 (1977); Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Compen-
sability of Psychological Disability Precipitated by Psychological Trauma, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1128;
Comment, Workers' Compensation for Mental Disabilities Resulting from Protracted Stress, 17 WIL-
LAMET=E L. REv. 693 (1981); Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Re-
actions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129 (1961); Waldholz, Stress Increasingly Seen as a Problem, with Executives
More Vulnerable, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1982, at 37, col. 6; Rice, Can Companies Kill?, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, June 1981, at 78; Lubin, On-the-Job Stress Leads Many Workers to File-and Win-Com-
pensation Awards, Wall. St. J., Sept. 17, 1980, at 33, col. 4; see also Joseph, The Causation Issue in
Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions and a Perspective, 36 VAND.
L. REv. 263 (1983).
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compensation law.2 Despite this difficulty, however, courts in a growing
number of jurisdictions are providing workers' compensation to claim-
ants in cases of gradual stress disability.
Although it is presently not known whether gradual stress disability
is compensable under Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act,4 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court will probably be required to decide this issue
in the future. The court's determination that gradual stress disabilty is
compensable will be logical. Compensating gradual stress disability is
consistent with the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, prior
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions, the underlying principles upon
which workers' compensation is based, and the national trend toward
compensating such claims.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GRADUAL STRESS DISABILITY
A. Background
As the rate of industrial accidents rose in the early twentieth cen-
tury, state legislatures enacted workers' compensation laws because the
common law remedies available to injured employees were inadequate.'
Legislatures intended to provide broad, no-fault coverage to all employ-
ees suffering work-related injuries.6 To implement this objective, work-
ers' compensation laws now require employers to compensate employees
for accidental injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment," 7
regardless of fault. In return for definite compensation under this no-
fault recovery system, employees relinquish their common law tort
claims against their employers. Thus, workers' compensation laws pro-
tect employers from potentially large damage awards, and guarantee em-
ployees compensation for work-related injuries that impair earning
2. Joseph, supra note 1, at 289.
3. lB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.25(c) (1987).
4. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
5. Before the enactment of workers' compensation, common law principles often prohibited an
employee's recovery for a work-related injury. The common law of torts required the injured worker
to prove that the employer was negligent. In addition, an employer had three defenses: contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant rules. These hurdles were almost insurmountable
for an injured employee seeking compensation under the common law. Manson, supra note 1.
These common law constraints can be attributed to the laissez-faire economic philosophy dominant
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual Stress
in the Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 854 (1985); lB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.0.
6. Comment, supra note 5, at 854-55.
7. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the difficulty in applying
this statutory language in gradual stress disability cases, see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:461
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Workers' compensation law has evolved from covering purely physi-
cal injuries to also compensating those injuries with a mental compo-
nent.9 Cases involving mental components are separated into three
categories: (1) mental stimuli causing physical injury; (2) physical
trauma causing a mental disability; and (3) mental stimuli causing
mental disability.10 Injuries contained in this third category of cases are
known as "purely mental" injuries.
Purely mental injuries are further divided into two classes. These
classes are determined by the type of mental stimulus causing the mental
disability. In the first class, a sudden work-related stimulus causes the
mental disability.11 In the second class, the mental disability is caused by
a gradual work-related stress that develops over time.12 This latter type
of purely mental injury is labelled "gradual stress disability."
Because of the subjective nature of mental disabilities, courts have
been reluctant to extend workers' compensation to such injuries. This
recalcitrance led early courts to only award compensation for purely
mental injuries resulting from sudden stimuli, since they are analogous to
8. For a comprehensive discussion regarding the theory of workers' compensation, see Recent
Development, Workers' Compensation: Problems in the Revision, Recommendation for the Future,
22 TULSA L.J. 425, 426 (1987); 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.11
(1986). In Weber v. Armco, Inc., 663 P.2d 1221 (Okla. 1983), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
Workers' compensation is a mutual compromise in which the employee relinquishes his/
her right to sue for damages sustained in job-related injuries; and the employer accepts no-
fault liability for a statutorily prescribed measure of damages. This trade-off has the net
effect of imposing a form of strict liability upon the employer to pay for industrial acci-
dents. As a result, workers' compensation is the exclusive damage remedy for the injured
employee; and the employer is given immunity from common-law tort liability.
Id. at 1224 (footnotes omitted).
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1243
(1970). The first two categories (mental-physical and physical-mental) are now universally accepted
as compensable. These categories are determined by two components: (1) the kind of stimulus
causing the disability; and (2) the nature of the disability itself. The third category (mental-mental)
is an area in which new law, reflecting the increasing ability of medicine and psychiatry to speak
authoritatively on the causes and consequences of mental and nervous injury, is currently being
developed. Id. at 1243-44.
11. See, eg., Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955) (the
mental stimulus was the claimant's sudden witnessing of his co-worker's violent death); Burlington
Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (the mental stimulus was the claimant's
sudden fright induced by an are of electricity from a motor with a short circuit).
12. See, eg., McLaren v. Webber Hosp. Ass'n, 386 A.2d 734 (Me. 1978) (the mental stimulus
was the gradual stress suffered by the claimant during an emotionally tense seminar his employer
required him to attend); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960)
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physical injuries.13 Courts were reluctant to compensate claims of purely
mental injuries because they feared that the claims might not be genu-
ine. 14 Professor Larson has referred to this concern as the "how could it
be real when ... it was purely mental" preconception. 15
Gradual stress disabilities are especially affected by judicial concern
for "genuineness." In cases involving a sudden mental stimulus, some
extraordinary event occurs. In this manner, sudden mental stimulus
cases resemble physical accident cases. Courts are able to analogize sud-
den mental stimulus with physical accident cases because they both re-
sult from particular identifiable events.16 However, in gradual stress
cases, the disability results from the gradual stress of employment, with
no easily identifiable event.
Because sudden mental injuries are more readily compensated than
gradual stress claims, courts appear to be more concerned with questions
of proof than with principled determinations over the kind of injury that
should be compensable.17 An event's evidentiary value in showing causa-
tion reassures courts that the injuries are genuine. 18 With no particular
event upon which to grasp, claimants seeking compensation for gradual
stress disability must prove: (1) that they suffered from a work-related
gradual stress and (2) that this stress caused the resulting mental disabil-
ity.' 9 Despite this burden, over a period of time, courts have compen-
sated claims for gradual stress disability.20
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14. Comment, supra note 5, at 859.
15. Professor Larson states:
This equation of "mental" with "unreal," or imaginary, or phoney, is so ingrained that it
has achieved a firm place in our idiomatic language. Who has not at some time, in dis-
missing a physical complaint of some suffering friend or relative, airily waved the com-
plaint aside by saying, "Oh, it's all in his head?" The impact of this pervasive
preconception on compensation decisions can be briefly stated. A high proportion of the
cases display a search for something-anything-that can be called "physical" to supply
the element of "reality" in the injury.
Larson, supra note 10, at 1243.
16. Comment, supra note 5, at 860 (citing IB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.21); Joseph, supra
note 2, at 287.
17. Comment, supra note 5, at 860. Most commentators believe that the distinction between a
sudden and gradual mental stimulus is unprincipled, both medically and legally. Id. at 849 (citing
Seizer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 951
(1971)); IB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.23(b). Professor Larson has stated that the distinction is
unsound because under workers' compensation law, when an injury has some physical component,
the gradual nature of the stimulus has not been an obstacle to recovery. Id.
18. Comment, supra note 5, at 860.
19. See infra note 46 Lnd accompanying text.
20. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:461
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B. Causation
Because of the difficulty in connecting a mental disability with the
gradual stress of employment, the claimant's primary obstacle to the
compensation of gradual stress disability is establishing causation.21 Un-
like most physical disabilities, 2 claims for gradual stress disabilities re-
quire expert medical testimony to prove causation. 3 However, this
medical evidence is intangible in nature. Furthermore, due to the ab-
sence of a single disabling event, isolating a work-related mental cause is
difficult.24 In addition, factors such as stress outside the workplace exac-
erbate the claimant's burden of proving causation."
The inherent difficulty in proving causation has led courts to formu-
late tests in order to determine whether a gradual stress disability is
work-related. Two principal tests have emerged: (1) the "unusual
stress" test, and (2) the "objective causation" test.2 6 In jurisdictions us-
ing the unusual stress test, courts award workers' compensation to a
claimant who establishes that a mental disability was caused by unusual,
unexpected, or extraordinary stress.2 7 In jurisdictions using the objective
21. The burden is upon the claimant to prove that the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
22. In most cases involving physical injuries, expert medical testimony is not necessary because
the causal connection is within the common knowledge and experience of the ordinary layperson.
Even if medical testimony is necessary in a physical injury case, it is easier to understand than the
comparable testimony in a purely mental injury case because it is easier to demonstrate physical
changes to the fact-finder than to demonstrate mental changes. Note, When Stress Becomes Distress:
Mental Disabilities Under Workers' Compensation in Massachusetts, 15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 287, 294
(1980).
23. Id. at 292. Establishing causation in a purely mental injury claim requires the use of expert
testimony because causation in mental injury cases is beyond the experience of laypersons and not a
matter of common knowledge. Medical testimony must establish that it is more likely that the
disability suffered by the claimant was caused by the employment, than by other causes. Id. at 292-
93.
24. Id. at 294. In Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 28, 268 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1978),
the Michigan Supreme Court recognized this evidentiary dilemma:
Perhaps some direct causal nexus with an employment event can be established in a few
cases. But in most cases a constellation of psychodynamic factors is involved; therefore, it
is almost impossible to weigh the causal significance of any one factor .... Psychoneuroses
and psychoses take on so many shades and forms as to show no logical pattern vis-a-vis any
notion of objective legal causation.
Id.
25. Id. The nature of gradual stress disabilities precludes easy categorization of their cause and
existence. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards For Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE
L.J. 1129 (1961). That Comment argues that the complex etiology of certain psychoneurotic reac-
tions makes it difficult to estimate the likelihood of an injury in the absence of employment. There-
fore, the causal significance of any one factor is frequently impossible to determine. Id. at 1142-44.
26. Comment, supra note 5, at 848.
27. Id. Unusual stress is evidenced by work-related pressures and tensions which are greater
than those experienced by the average employee. Id. Ten jurisdictions apply the unusual stress test.
See, eg., Sloss v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 Ariz. 10, -, 588 P.2d 303, 304 (1978); Townsend v.
5
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causation test, the claimant is merely required to establish a causal con-
nection between the mental disability and the gradual stress of everyday
employment.28
C. Judicial Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability
Twenty-five jurisdictions now compensate purely mental injuries
under workers' compensation statutes. 29  Of these twenty-five jurisdic-
tions, at least nineteen compensate gradual stress disability.30 According
to jurisdictions compensating mental disabilities, these disabilities are no
less compensable if caused by substantial stress, rather than sudden
shock.31 Carter v. General Motors Corp.32 is the leading case allowing
compensation of gradual stress disability. Professor Larson has de-
scribed the factual scenario:
Here we have the modem industrial tragedy, not at the executive level,
but at the level of the assembly line, with a set of facts recalling Charlie
Chaplin's losing battle with this inhuman antagonist in Modern Times.
The claimant, who had considerable emotional trouble in his back-
ground, simply could not keep up with the assembly line, as a result of
which he found himself constantly berated by his foreman. This in
turn filled him with dread of losing his job, and the final result was a
disabling psychosis.33
Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Me. 1979); Seitz v. L & R Indus., Inc., 437 A.2d
1345, 1351 (R.I. 1981); Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977); School Dist. #1 v.
Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, -, 215 N.W.2d 373, 377(1974); Owens v. National Health Laboratories, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 829 (Ark. App. 1983).
28. Comment, supra note 5, at 848. That Comment argues that the objective causation test is
more appropriate than the unusual stress test for determining whether claims of gradual stress disa-
bility are compensable. It states that the objective causation test is preferable because: (1) it is more
consistent with the policies of comprehensive coverage that animate workers compensation states;
and (2) the unusual stress test is predicated on a misguided view of causation, which will often deny
compensation to claimants whose injuries are in fact work-related. Id. Nine jurisdictions apply the
objective causation test. See, ag., Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986); McGarrah v.
SAIF, 296 Or. 145, -, 675 P.2d 159, 167 (1983); Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r,
285 S.E.2d 398, 400 (W. Va. 1981); Yocom v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796, 798-800 (Ky. 1976); Royal
State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, _, 487 P.2d 278, 282(1971); Alberson's Inc. v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308,-.., 182 Cal.
Rptr. 304, 307 (1982).
29. For a list of these jurisdictions and case-by-case analysis, see 1B A. LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 45.25(c).
30. Id. §§ 42.25(f) & (g). See supra notes 27-28.
31. IB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 43.23(b).
32. 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960). A number of commentators have written about the
Carter decision. See Joseph, supra note 2, at 297, for a list.
33. Larson, supra note 10, at 1252.
[Vol. 23:461
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The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the claimant's award of com-
pensation. 4 The court reasoned that the basic purpose of workers' com-
pensation mandates that a worker disabled as a result of a work-related
mental injury receive the same treatment as a worker disabled by a work-
related physical injury. Benefits are not awarded for the injury, but
rather for the loss of earning capacity." All courts that have allowed
compensation for gradual stress disability have either implicitly or ex-
plicitly advocated this same reasoning.36
III. GRADUAL STRESS DISABILITY IN OKLAHOMA
A. The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act
The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) contains the
almost universal requirement that for compensation to be awarded, a
claimant must establish an "accidental personal injury, arising out of and
in the course of employment."37 According to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, an "accidental injury" is an unexpected or unintentional event.38
The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" are generally taken
34. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, -, 106 N.W.2d 105, 114 (1960).
35. Id. at -, 106 N.W.2d at 106.
36. See Joseph, supra note 2, at 298. For example, in Baker v. Worker's Compensation Appeals
Bd., 18 Cal. App.3d 852, 861-62, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (1971) "[A] disabling [physical] injury may
be the result of the cumulative effect of each day's stresses and strains. We perceive no logical basis
for a different requirement for a psychoneurotic injury. To one experiencing it, such an injury is as
real and as disabling as a physical injury." Id. (citations omitted). Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Appeals Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 38, 487 P.2d 278, 282 (1971).
In Townsend v. Main Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Me. 1979), the court stated:
If we were to cordon off gradual mental injuries from the Act's purview, the Commission
and ultimately this Court would be forced to decide whether in a given instance a disability
was a non-compensable gradual mental injury or a compensable gradual physical injury.
This is a distinction without a difference, for under contemporary medical theory mind and
body comprise a single, complex, and integrated unit.
Id.
37. The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act provides:
Every employer subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall pay, or
provide as required by the Workers' Compensation Act, compensation according to the
schedules of the Workers' Compensation Act for the disability or death of his employee
resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in
the course of his employment.
OKLA. STAT. tit 85, § 11 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). The Act defines an injury or personal
injury:
"Injury or personal injury" means only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course
of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally result therefrom and occupa-
tional disease arising out of and in the course of employment as herein defined. Provided,
only injuries having as their source a risk not purely personal but one that is reasonably
connected with the conditions of employment shall be deemed to arise out of the em-
ployment.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(7) (Supp. 1987).
38. An often quoted definition of accidental injury appears in Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v.
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together to form a single standard of compensability known as "work
connection. ' 39 However, these terms must be separately examined to de-
termine the requirements necessary to satisfy each part of the test.40
"Arising out of" contemplates a causal relationship between the employ-
ment requirements and the act engaged in at the time the injury occurs.4 1
"In the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the
injury.42 All three terms43 are issues of fact and must be established to
Atkinson, 192 Okla. 322, 135 P.2d 960 (1943). There, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated as
follows:
An "accident" is an event happening without any human agency, or if happening through
human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and not expected to
the person to whom it happens. In the term "accidental injuries," the substantive "inju-
ries" expresses the notion of a thing or event, that is, the wrong or damage done to the
person, while "accidental" qualifies and describes the noun by ascribing to "injuries" a
quality or condition of happening, or coming by chance or without design, taking place
unexpectedly or unintentionally.
Id. at 323-24, 135 P.2d at 961-62 (citations omitted).
The 1986, Oklahoma Workers' Compensation reform legislation placed a restriction on the
statutory definition of accidental personal injury. Employees will no longer be compensated for
injuries occurring in the course of employment, but which do not arise out of employment because of
a purely personal risk to the employee. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(7) (Supp. 1987).
39. Note, supra note 22, at 291. For a discussion of the dual requirement of work-connection,
see Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement Reap-
praised, 51 N.C.L. REV. 705 (1973).
40. These terms are not synonymous, but are conjunctive terms. Ogg v. Bill White Chevrolet
Co., 720 P. 2d 324, 325 (Okla. 1986).
41. An injury "arises out of" the employment when two elements are satisfied: (1) the injury
resulted from a risk reasonably incident to the employment; and (2) a causal connection exists be-
tween the employment and resulting injury. While both of these elements comprise the "causal
relationship," the former element mandates the injury to be a foreseeable consequence of that em-
ployment. See Norton v. E. A. Cowen Constr. Co., 391 P.2d 785, 788 (Okla. 1964); Novak v.
McAlister, 301 P.2d 234 (Okla. 1956). In Novak, the court stated the following:
An injury does not arise out of the employment within the meaning of our Workmen's
Compensation Act, unless it resulted from a risk reasonably incident to the employment,
and unless there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circum-
stances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is being per-
formed and the resulting injury.
Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
The "arising out of" requirement is found in all workers' compensation statutes. The require-
ment illustrates the compromise behind the statutes which requires: (1) employers to bear the initial
cost of an injury that arises from an employment-related risk, regardless of "fault," and (2) employ-
ees to surrender their common-law right of tort recovery. This requirement incorporates the pri-
mary policy or legal causation formula by holding employers responsible only for compensating
employment-related risks. Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977, 980 (Alaska 1986); see Joseph, supra
note 2, at 280-83.
42. An injury occurs in the course of employment when it occurs within the spatial and tempo-
ral boundaries of employment. See Note, supra note 22, at 291. Professor Larson has stated that
"an injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place within the period of
the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his
duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto." I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMENS'
COMPENSATION § 14.00 (1985).
43. The terms are "accidental personal injury," "arising out of" employment, and "arising in
the course of" employment.
8
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prove a compensable injury under the Act." Thus, all personal injuries
that occur in the workplace are not covered by the Act.
In the relationship between "arising out of" and "in the course of,"
both terms do not carry equal weight. As a practical matter, if the injury
arises out of the employment, the injury also arises in the course of em-
ployment; however, the opposite is not necessarily true. For an injury to
have arisen out of the employment, the injury must be causally related to
the employment. This causal relation requires a showing that the injury
occurred during the course of employment. On the other hand, a deter-
mination that the injury arose "in the course of employment" only indi-
cates that the injury occurred while the employee was working. It does
not demonstrate that the injury resulted from employment. Conse-
quently, the "course of employment" requirement has not been examined
as closely as the "arising out of" requirement in mental injury cases.4 5
Oklahoma courts addressing gradual stress disability cases encoun-
ter a two-fold problem in determining whether this type of injury is com-
pensable.46 First, the court must determine if the gradual development
of mental and emotional strain constitutes an "accidental personal in-
jury" within the meaning of the Act.47 Second, if the statutory definition
of "accidental personal injury" is met, the court must determine if there
was sufficient causation: whether gradual stress disability actually arose
out of the employment.48
B. Judicial Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability in Oklahoma
1. The Vernon and Daugherty Misconception
Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores49 and Daugherty v. ITT Continental
Baking Co. 50 are the only Oklahoma Supreme Court cases which involve
gradual stress disability claims. Cases and commentators 51 have cited
Vernon and Daugherty52 as the seminal cases supporting the proposition
44. Ogg, 720 P.2d at 325-26; Andrews, 192 Okla. at 323, 135 P.2d at 961.
45. Render, Mental Illness As An Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L. REv. 288, 296 (1964).
46. Note, Recovery for Nervous Injury Resulting from Mental Stimulus Under Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws, 53 CH.[-]KENT. L. REV. 731, 744 (1977).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976).
50. 558 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1976).
51. Candelara v. General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167,._, 730 P.2d 470, 474 (1986); McGarrah v.
SAIF, 296 Or. 145, -, 675 P.2d 159, 164 (1983); IB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.24(d); Note,
Workers' Compensation for Mental Disabilities Resulting from Protracted Stress, 17 WILLAMEITE L.
REV. 693, 695 (1981); Note, supra note 22, at 298.
52. lB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.25(d); Note, supra note 22, at 298.
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that Oklahoma has ruled against the compensation of purely mental inju-
ries. However, neither the Vernon court nor the Daugherty court ruled
on this issue.53 Consequently, these cases do not preclude Oklahoma's
compensation of purely mental injuries.
a. The Vernon Decision
The claimant in Vernon maintained that because a nervous break-
down resulting from his discharge and ensuing events impaired his earn-
ing capacity his disability was compensable under the Act.54 Vernon was
a manager of a Seven-Eleven store who was required to take a polygraph
test due to the loss of merchandise from his store. 5 On the following
day, Vernon's supervisor informed him that he failed the polygraph test
and would be automatically discharged. 6 Vernon's application for un-
employment compensation was denied. 7 Subsequently, he filed a claim
for workers' compensation, alleging that the events 8 following the poly-
graph test precipitated a nervous breakdown. 9
Because Vernon's nervous breakdown did not arise out of and in the
course of employment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not rule on the
compensability of a purely mental injury without an accompanying phys-
ical injury. 0 His mental condition did not result from the manner of
53. Because the claimants were unable to establish the requisite causal connection between their
employment and subsequent mental conditions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address the
issue of whether purely mental injuries resulting from a risk reasonably incident to employment are
compensable. Vernon, 547 P.2d at 1301-02; Daugherty, 558 P.2d at 395. See infra notes 60-64, 72-75
and accompanying text.
54. Vernon, 547 P.2d at 1301.
55. Id. at 1300. Vernon previously underwent several polygraph tests without complaint.
There was nothing unusual about this test, and he did not become upset when he took it. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. If failure of the polygraph test alone precipitated Vernon's nervous breakdown, this would
be a claim for mental injury resulting from a sudden mental stimulus. However, since Vernon and
his medical testimony alleged that the nervous breakdown was caused by the polygraph test and
ensuing events (Vernon's discharge and denial of unemployment compensation), this is a claim for
mental injury resulting from gradual mental stimuli.
59. Id.
60. Although the court did not rule on the compensability of purely mental injuries, it ad-
dressed related decisions. The court acknowledged prior Oklahoma decisions which recognized the
compensability of mental injuries when prior physical injuries induced post-traumatic neurosis. Id.
at 1301. The court declined to discuss whether physical trauma is a prerequisite for the compen-
sability of a mental injury, and instead discussed Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan.
613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966). The Vernon court stated that Jacobs expressed the contrary view in com-
pensating purely mental injuries: only a traumatic neurosis which follows an accompanying physical
injury is compensable.
However, whether Jacobs requires a physical injury before a mental injury is compensable is
unclear. The claimant in Jacobs alleged that the lower court denied compensation based entirely on
its assumption that a physical injury was a prerequisite for the compensability of a mental injury
10
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discharge6' (events still intrinsic to the employment relationship before
discharge), but rather from the act of discharge and subsequent denial of
unemployment compensation. Prior to his discharge, Vernon was in
good health.62 Vernon's mental condition developed after his dis-
charge.3 He became increasingly upset when rejected for unemploy-
ment compensation. 64 Thus, because Vernon's disability did not arise
out of and in the course of employment, he was unable to establish the
work-connection necessary to constitute an "accidental personal injury"
under the Act.65
b. The Daugherty Decision
Daugherty claimed that the events surrounding the request for her
resignation caused her psychological injury.66 Daugherty was a thrift
store manager, who alleged that her superior made critical remarks re-
garding her work performance in the presence of customers67 and later
under the Kansas Workers' Compensation Act. The Kansas Supreme Court responded that Jacob's
interpretation of the district court's findings was unwarranted, and that he completely overlooked
the fact that the lower court found that he "did not suffer personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment." Id. at 988.
Jacobs alleged that his disability was due to a mental illness brought about by his attempts to
meet his quota, and his supervisor's ultimatums. However, Jacobs failed to present any medical
evidence to support a causal connection between his alleged mental illness and his employment. In
fact, the only medical evidence presented contradicted his position. The court concluded that Jacobs
failed to establish the necessary causal connection, and that his mental illness apparently resulted
from the conflicting demands of management and co-workers, rather than the nature and require-
ments ofhis job. Id. at 988-90. Thus, under the appropriate factual circumstances, Jacobs might not
preclude compensation for a purely mental injury. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Recov-
ery for Mental Injury Caused by Mental Impact, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 552, 556 (1977), for a similar
discussion.
61. The Oregon Supreme Court has previously recognized the compensability of purely mental
injuries, see supra note 28. However, it recently held that compensation could not be awarded for a
claim similar to that in Vernon. In Elwood v. SAIF, 298 Or. 429, 693 P.2d 641 (1985), the court
addressed whether a claimant's alleged mental injury resulting from discharge was compensable
under workers' compensation. The Elwood court held that a mental disability resulting from the act
of discharge was not a compensable risk of employment. However, the court stated that the "man-
ner of discharge," which can be regarded as events still intrinsic to the employment relationship
before termination, can lead to compensation. Stressful events accompanying the discharge can
make a resulting mental condition compensable; illness resulting from the mere act of discharge and
loss of employment is not. Id. at 642.
62. Vernon, 547 P.2d at 1300.
63. Vernon attributed his mental and emotional instablity to events following the polygraph
test, i.e., his discharge. Id.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 37.
66. Daugherty, 558 P.2d at 394. Daugherty testified that she did not think she would ever be
able to meet the public again; her nerves were "shot," and her husband had suffered a heart attack.
67. Id. Daugherty's superior went to the front of the store where customers were shopping and
remarked that the store arrangement looked like"hell" to him. Id.
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requested her resignation.68 Daugherty became emotionally upset by the
events69 surrounding the request for her resignation and was subse-
quently hospitalized.7" She filed a workers' compensation claim for her
emotional injury.7 1
Daugherty's mental condition was not causally related to her em-
ployment.71  Although she became emotionally upset during the course
of employment,7 3 Daugherty did not prove that her condition arose out
of employment.74 Apparently, her mental condition was not a risk rea-
sonably incident to her employment.75 As a result, Daugherty was
unable to establish the work-connection necessary to constitute an "acci-
dental personal injury" under the Act, which is a prerequisite to
compensation.
c. The Vernon and Daugherty Rationale
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rule that lower court findings will
not be disturbed on review where supported by any competent evidence
explains the results in Vernon and Daugherty.76 In both cases, substan-
tial evidence supported the State Industrial Court's finding that no
causal relation was established.77 Contrary to existing commentary,78
the results in Vernon and Daugherty do not require an accompanying
68. Id. When her superior handed her a letter of resignation to sign and she read it, Daugherty
said, "[I ]t just seemed like my whole world fell apart." Id.
69. Id. Daugherty's alleged mental injury was triggered by the events surrounding her request
to resign. These events included her superior's remarks, the request for her resignation, and her




72. The State Industrial Court found that Daugherty did not sustain an "accidental personal
injury." Id. at 395. In this regard, the Oklahoma Supreme Court referred to Vernon v. Seven-Eleven
Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976) and Keeling v. State Indus. Court, 389 P.2d 487 (Okla. 1964) to
emphasize Daugherty's failure to establish the requisite causal relation between her employment and
her mental condition. Id.
73. Because she did not resign, Daugherty's mental condition developed during the course of
her employment. Id. at 394.
74. In discussing Keeling, the court in Daugherty stated that "[w]e sustained [the] Industrial
Court's order denying compensation and held that a disease of body or mind arising during employ-
ment, with nothing more, is not within [the] Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 395 (emphasis
added).
75. Like the claimant in Keeling (who suffered a nervous breakdown from nervousness and
strain caused by the position in which she was compelled to sit at work), it is not likely that Daugh-
erty's mental disability arose from a risk reasonably incident to her employment. In all likelihood,
her mental disability was not reasonably incident to her employer's remarks, and request for her
resignation. Id. at 395.
76. Vernon, 547 P.2d at 1301-02; Daugherty, 558 P.2d at 395.
77. Vernon, 547 P.2d at 1302; Daugherty, 558 P.2d at 395.
78. See supra note 51.
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physical trauma or impact for the compensation of a purely mental in-
jury. Rather, these decisions reinforce the claimants' statutory burden of
establishing a causal relation between their employment and mental dis-
ability: a prereqisite to workers' compensation under the Act. Unless
the Oklahoma Supreme Court denies workers' compensation to a claim-
ant who establishes that a purely mental injury is reasonably incident to,
and causally related to the employment, it cannot be said that Oklahoma
has ruled against the compensation of purely mental injuries.
2. The "Cause" Cases
Prior to Vernon and Daugherty, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
denied workers' compensation in a line of cases involving injuries that
were not purely mental, but contained mental components.79 In each of
these cases, the claimant failed to establish that the injuries were causally
related to his employment. This line of cases includes Ada Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Snead,"° In re Loague,1 Liebmann Arctic Ice Co. v. Hen-
derson,82 and Keeling v. State Industrial Court.3 In these cases, the
claimants were unable to prove that the mental component, a mental
stimulus or mental injury, resulted from a risk reasonably incident to
their employment. These cases are important to Oklahoma's eventual
compensation of gradual stress disability because each contains a com-
prehensive causation analysis of a claim containing a mental component.
a. The Snead Decision
Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead 4 is the best known Oklahoma
case addressing the causal connection between an accidental physical in-
jury and a mental component. The eighty-year-old Mr. Snead had an
accident on January 7, 1957. s1 While carrying Coca-Cola bottles, Mr.
Snead caught his foot on a pallet leg, tripped, fell to the concrete floor,
79. A mental component is a mental element used in the classification of workers' compensa-
tion cases. A mental element can be a mental stimulus or a mental disability. By definition, purely
mental injury cases contain both a mental stimulus and resulting mental disability. The "cause
cases," however, only contain one or the other.
80. 364 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1961).
81. 450 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1969). Both Snead and Loague are frequently cited to support
Oklahoma's denial of compensation for injuries resulting from mental worry or stress.
82. 486 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1971). For a comprehensive discussion of this case, see Note, Work-
men's Compensation - Accidental Injuries Arising Out of Employment, 39 TENN. L. REV. 366 (1972).
83. 389 P.2d 487 (Okla. 1964).
84. 364 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1961).
85. Id. at 698. Mr. Snead had previously had two amputations of the left leg and had suffered
a heart attack in 1952. Id. at 697-98.
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and suffered bruises and abrasions.16 On January 26, 1957, Mr. Snead
had a stroke and became totally disabled- 7 He died of a second stroke
on December 13, 1959.88
The claimant's 9 recovery was premised on a tenuous causal connec-
tion. The claimant alleged that: (1) the accident of January 7th was a
contributing cause to the stroke on January 26th; (2) the stroke on Janu-
ary 26th caused Mr. Snead to become totally disabled; (3) the disability
caused him to worry about his inability to work and provide for his fam-
fly; and (4) the worry was a contributing factor to the acute coronary
thrombosis (stroke) which was the immediate cause of his death.90 The
issue was whether Mr. Snead's worry, the mental component, provided a
causal link between his January 7th accidental physical injury and De-
cember 13th death, sufficient to establish that his death resulted from an
injury "arising out of his employment." 91
The causal connection between Mr. Sneads' accident and subse-
quent death was too remote and uncertain to satisfy the Act's "arising
out of employment"92 requirement. The court relied on the rule of No-
vak v. McAlister :93 an injury does not arise out of employment unless
(1) it results from a risk reasonably incident to the employment, and (2) a
causal connection exists between the required conditions of employment
and resulting injury.9 4 In discussing previous cases awarding compensa-
tion for heart disease, the court noted that almost without exception,
these cases contained three factors which supported the causal relation-
ship between the claimant's employment and resulting heart disease.95
86. Id. at 698. Although Mr. Snead continued to work, he began seeing his family doctor for
treatment. Between January 7th and January 26th, 1957, Mr. Snead was treated several times for his
injury from the fall. Id.
87. Id. Mr. Snead's family doctor (Dr. M) opined that there was no connection between the
injury of January 7th and the cerebral thrombosis (stroke) of January 26th. Id.
88. Id. Dr. M continued treatment until early May, 1957, then his were discontinued and Dr.
F began treating Mr. Snead. Dr. F treated Mr. Snead until his death on December 13, 1959. At the
time of death, Dr. F signed a death certificate for Mr. Snead which the claimant introduced as
evidence. It listed acute coronary thrombosis as the immediate cause of death. It did not mention
the injury on January 7, 1957. Id.
89. The claimant was Mr. Snead's surviving wife. Id. at 697.
90. Id. at 698.
91. Id. The court noted that "[c]oronary thrombosis is one of the ailments included within the
meaning of the general term "heart disease." Heart disease, like any other disease or injury, is not
compensable unless it arises out of, and in the course of, the employment concerned." 1d.
92. Id. at 698-99.
93. 301 P.2d 234, 236 (Okla. 1956).
94. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
95. Snead, 364 P.2d at 699. The court delineated the three factors as: "(1) unusual physical
effort, exertion or strain; (2) physical manifestation of pain or discomfort in the region of the chest or
[Vol. 23:461
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The court then emphasized the absence of these factors in Snead.9 6 The
court concluded that "worry," in the context of worrying over one's in-
ability to provide for one's family, was not a risk reasonably incident to
employment within the Novak rule.97
b. The Loague Decision
In In re Loague,98 the Oklahoma Supreme Court again focused on
the causal relationship to hold that the claimant's "worry" was not a risk
reasonably incident to his employment.99 Once again, the court was con-
fronted with a remote causal connection. In Loague, the claimanti" ° al-
leged that: (1) his face and hands were covered with prior job-connected
bums; (2) these burns caused him emotional strain because he worried
that he would be unable to support his family; (3) the emotional strain
triggered the development of diabetes; and (4) the diabetes and its com-
plications ultimately caused his death. 01 Unless worrying over the in-
ability to work and earn wages is a risk "reasonably incident" to the
employment, the consequences of such worrying are not covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act."12 The court concluded that to its knowl-
edge no case has held the consequences of emotional stress, under such
circumstances, to be compensable.10
3
heart at the time of the accident or shortly thereafter; and (3) a heart attack of some kind within
hours or a very few days after the accident." Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. The court stated in the instant case that ". . . no unusual exertion or strain was shown;
there was no evidence of pain indicating any kind of heart involvement at the time of the original
accident; and the heart attack did not occur till almost three years after the accident." Id. (emphasis
in original).
However, the court cautioned as follows:
It should not be inferred from our discussion of the "three factors" that we are setting out
any general rule to be followed in future cases involving disability or death due to heart
disease. Our purpose has been merely to demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence in
the instant case on the question of "causal relationship" between the accident and the heart
disease.
Id.
97. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court later clarified the type of "worry" used in Snead, in In
re Loague, 450 P.2d 492, 496 (Okla. 1969). See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
98. 450 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1969).
99. Id. at 496.
100. The claimant was Mr. Loague's surviving wife. Id. at 493.
101. Id. at 496. According to the testimony of the claimant, following his job-connected injuries,
Mr. Loague became "just a nervous wreck because we owed bills and everything like that." Id.
102. Id. The court acknowledged that the claimant's medical witness' testimony was not seri-
ously disputed - that emotional stress or worry in an individual such as the claimant (a "pre-
diabetic," is a person who has the potentiality of contracting diabetes because of hereditary factors,
but who has not yet developed the objective symptoms of it) may precipitate an onset of diabetes. Id.
103. Id.
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c. The Snead and Loague Implications
Like Vernon and Daugherty, the Snead and Loague decisions do not
preclude compensation for injuries resulting from mental worry or stress
under the appropriate circumstances. Both cases may be explained by
their respective factual circumstances. In Snead and Loague, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with a tenuous causal connec-
tion between the claimants'i "worry" and subsequent deaths. In Loague,
the court clarified its use of the term "worry" in Snead and noted that
non-work-related worry (such as worrying about providing for one's
family), as distinguished from a truly work-related worry, was not rea-
sonably incident to employment."° Therefore, worrying about family
support is not a foreseeable risk of employment. However, by negative
implication, the court's clarification in Loague suggests that a work-re-
lated worry, such as worrying over the amount of work to be done or the
method of doing the work, may be reasonably incident to employment.
In such a case, if a claimant established the requisite causal connection
between a work-related worry and resulting injury, the court would pre-
sumably award compensation.
d. The Liebmann Decision
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that Liebmann Arctic Ice
Co. v. Henderson 1 05 presented novel factual circumstances; the court was
not aware of another case in which the claimant's own anger precipitated
a psychological or emotional trauma.106 The claimant in Liebmann had
a history of headaches, high blood pressure, a volatile temper, and was
"pre-disposed" to a stroke. As manager of his employer's ice dock, his
duties included keeping clear an off-street parking area to provide access
to the dock. 107 The claimant's recovery rested upon the following causal
allegations: (1) the claimant saw a wrecker parked in the area; (2) he
asked the driver to move; (3) the driver ignored his request and went into
the cafe without making a reply; (4) this angered the claimant; and
(5) that anger was the "exciting and inciting" cause of a disabling stroke
104. Id. at 496.
105. 486 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1971).
106. Id. at 741.
107. Id. at 740-41.
[Vol. 23:461
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that the claimant suffered a short time later.108 The claimant's own med-
ical witness testified that the stroke was due solely to the claimant's an-
ger, and not to any external physical force.'0 9
The claimant's stroke was not a risk reasonably incident to his em-
ployment. The court determined that the risk that the claimant, while
performing a routine risk in a routine way, might become so angry as to
precipitate a stroke which was attributed solely to the claimant's own
anger and not to any physical effort, exertion or external force," 0 was
not a risk reasonably incident to the claimant's employment."' Because
the claimant's anger was not reasonably incident to his employment, his
resulting stroke did not "arise out of employment." 1 2 Therefore, the
causal connection required for compensation was missing.
Justice Hodges dissented in Liebmann and argued that the
Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act made no distinction between in-
juries resulting from physical effort and injuries resulting from mental
strain.11 3 In support, Justice Hodges cited a New Jersey decision, Fink v.
City of Paterson, "4 which had been cited and quoted with approval in a
prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decision.' In Fink, the employer
harassed the claimant, and the claimant consequently suffered a heart
attack. In awarding compensation, the Fink court held that where the
heart failure was caused by unusual strain or exertion beyond the mere
108. Id. at 741.
109. Id. at 741.
110. The court acknowledged prior decisions awarding compensation to injuries precipitated by
a mental stimulus and distinguished them from Liebmann. Compensation was awarded in Dalton
Barnard Hardware Co. v. Gates, 203 Okla. 268, 220 P.2d 249 (1950) when an employer's verbal
assault precipitated a female employee's high blood pressure, caused her to faint and fall, and re-
sulted in a back injury. In Northwestern Refining Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 145 Okla. 72, 291 P.
533 (1930), the court awarded compensation when an explosion that occurred in a nearby refinery
frightened the claimant, caused him to jump from a ladder, and resulted in a back and ankle injury.
The Liebmann court distinguished Dalton and Northwestern from Liebmann, because in the former
cases, the claimant suffered a sudden shock or fright caused by an external force; they were either
threatened or in fear of apparent danger. In contrast, the claimant in Liebmann was performing a
routine duty, and his anger was not caused by any external force, either verbal or physical. Id. at
741-42.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 742. The court stated that:
It is readily apparent that sophisticated reasoning can demonstrate an abstractly logical
"causal connection" between two conditions or factors bearing almost any other kind of
connection with each other. The truth is well illustrated by the following remark of claim-
ant's medical witness while discussing this subject: "Listen, I'm sure there's a relationship
between Jake's being born and this thing." This is the reason for the additional require-
ment that the injury result from a risk reasonably incident to the employment.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
113. Id at 742.
114. 44 N.J. Super. 129, 129 A.2d 746 (1957).
115. Bill Gover Ford Co. v. Roniger, 426 P.2d 701, 704 (Okla. 1967).
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employment itself, the strain need not be physical or laborious in charac-
ter, but may consist of "unusual emotional or nervous strain and
anxiety." 116
The dissent's application of Fink supported the view that injuries
resulting from emotional strain may be compensable, but raised the ques-
tion of whether the emotional strain in Liebmann was unusual. 1 7 Ap-
parently, the majority in Liebmann did not find the circumstances to be
unusual by stating the claimant was performing a routine duty and ob-
serving that it was not unusual for vehicles to park where the wrecker
was parked.118 By insisting upon some external force, the majority was
not controverting the logic of Fink but was concluding that the claim-
ant's anger was not precipitated by unusual circumstances.
e. The Keeling Decision
In Keeling v. State Industrial Court,119 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court again examined the causal connection. It referred to Novak and
Snead and determined that the claimant's nervous breakdown was not
reasonably incident to employment.120 In Keeling, the court was
presented with the following causal allegations: (1) the claimant was em-
ployed as a seamstress; (2) she operated a sewing machine that required a
certain physical posture; and (3) that posture along with the nervous
strain she suffered from being transferred to a new job caused her ner-
vous breakdown. 12
1
The court focused on the distinction between a physical injury re-
sulting from improper posture and a mental injury or disease resulting
from improper posture.122 The distinction was determinative because
while a physical injury resulting from improper posture may be compen-
sable, a mental injury is not. The Oklahoma Supreme Court illustrated
this distinction by quoting from two cases. In Shoren v. United States
Rubber Co., 123 the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated as follows:
A disease, which under any rational work is likely to progress so as
finally to disable the employee, does not become a "personal injury"
under the act merely because it reaches the point of disablement while
116. Fink, 44 N.J. Super. at -, 129 A.2d at 748.
117. See Note, supra note 82, at 369.
118. Liebmann, 486 P.2d at 741.
119. 389 P.2d 487 (Okla. 1964).
120. Id. at 491.
121. Id. at 488.
122. Id. at 491.
123. 87 R.I. 319, 140 A.2d 768 (1958).
[Vol. 23:461
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work for a subscriber is being pursued. It is only when there is a direct
causal connection between the exertion of the employment and the in-
jury that an award of compensation can be made.124
This distinction was more clearly marked out in the Massachusetts case
of In re Maggelet,12 1 where the court denied compensation and stated,
"[t]he disease must be, or be traceable directly to, a personal injury pecu-
liar to the employment."
1 26
In Keeling, Justice Berry's special concurring opinion agreed with
the majority on the basis of the facts presented, but noted that a mental
injury could be compensable if it actually resulted from the particular
employment. 127 He recognized the complexity of the human mind and
noted that the various causes of mental illness are often speculative.
Therefore, competent evidence 12 8 was necessary to remove speculation as
to the cause of the mental injury. 129 However, he concluded that evi-
dence showing that the employment was merely incidental to the mental
condition would not be sufficient.
1 30
3. The "Stepping Stones" Toward Oklahoma's Compensation of
Gradual Stress Disability
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet awarded com-
pensation for a purely mental injury resulting from gradual stress, the
court has never expressly held that a purely mental injury was not com-
pensable. 131 In fact, a close examination of prior Oklahoma Supreme
Court decisions reveals that the court has awarded compensation for
everything short of purely mental claims. These decisions are the step-
ping stones leading toward Oklahoma's recognition of gradual stress
disability.
a. The Liberal Construction of "'Accidental Injury"
In 1943, Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v. Atkinson 32 provided a
124. Id. at -, 140 A.2d at 771.
125. 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972 (1917).
126. Id. at 59, 116 N.E. at 974 (emphasis added).
127. Keeling, 389 P.2d at 492. Justice Berry stated that "[t]he anxiety attendant upon maintain-
ing one's position of employment may, under certain conditions, be considered together with other
circumstances occurring during and in the course of employment which may combine to produce a
compensable injury." Id.
128. Justice Berry was referring to competent expert testimony. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
132. 192 Okla. 322, 135 P.2d 960 (1943).
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stepping stone toward the compensation of purely mental injuries. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court clarified its commitment to the rule that "the
term 'accidental injury' is not to be given a narrow or restricted meaning,
but is to receive a broad and liberal construction, with a view of compen-
sating injured employees where disabilities result from compensable per-
sonal injuries." 133 A broad and liberal construction of the term
"accidental injury" is both consistent with workers' compensation policy
(compensation is based on impaired earning capacity) and is necessary
for the recognition of purely mental injuries because mental injuries, as
well as physical injuries, can render an employee unable to continue em-
ployment. As this liberal construction of accidental injury incorporates
workers' compensation policy into the determination of compensation, it
leads to an understanding that a mental disability may constitute an acci-
dental personal injury within workers' compensation law.
b. "Cumulative" Accidental Injuries
A number of Oklahoma decisions provide that an accidental injury
need not be attributable to one particular event, but may arise progres-
sively from the cumulative effect of a series of exertion episodes.134 The
importance of these decisions is clear: for purely mental injuries result-
ing from gradual stress to be compensable under the Oklahoma Workers'
Compensation Act, the term "accidental injury" must be interpreted as
an injury that can develop over a period of time.
Perhaps the best known case compensating a "cumulative" injury is
Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Edwards.1 35 The claimant's disability was
attributed to a continual process rather than to any specific event that
had developed over a period of eight years.13 6 His employer contended
that because the claimant's injury was not the result of any particular
happening or event, it was not an "accidental injury" within the meaning
of the Workers' Compensation Act.1 37 A liberal consruction of "acci-
dental injury" required the court to recognize that an injury may be in-
flicted progressively and over a period of time. An accidental injury is
not confined to infliction on one definite date or to being the result of an
133. Id. at 323, 135 P.2d at 961 (citations omitted).
134. See H. J. Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1964); G. T. Harvey Co. v.
Steele, 347 P.2d 802 (Okla. 1959); Calhoun Constr. Co. v. Sexton, 288 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1955); Acme
Material Co. v. Wheeler, 278 P.2d 234 (Okla. 1954).
135. 311 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1957).




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/4
1988] GRADUAL STRESS DISABILITY
isolated or particular event. 138 The Oklahoma Legislature had never
shown an intent to restrict the meaning of accidental injury to a tangible
event. 139
c. Compensability of a Mental Injury Resulting from an
Accompanying Physical Injury
Since 1925, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that a
mental disability resulting from an accompanying accidental physical in-
jury is compensable. 14° In Rialto Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Industrial
Commission,' the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment when he fell from a pole and landed
on his back. 42 Medical testimony revealed that the claimant suffered
from a traumatic injury to the lumbar region and muscles of his back,
and that the back injury developed into a neurosis. 143 After the claim-
ant's physical impairments abated, the claimant suffered a nervous break-
down and was diagnosed as suffering from "neurasthenia." 1" The court
noted the absence of any evidence of malingering 45 and relied on English
cases to hold that when a mental condition directly results from a physi-
cal injury sustained by an employee, which deprives the employee from
working in his former occupation, compensation would be awarded. 146
138. Id. at 254-55. The court expressly abandoned the idea that an accidental injury must have
been the result of a specific event, where the evidence shows that the claimant's disability is caused
by trauma, or by some external force. Id. at 253.
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon language it quoted at length from American
Jurisprudence. The court quoted in part:
Ordinarily, an injury, to be accidental within the meaning of the statute, must be traceable
to a definite time, place, and cause. This is the usual test for distinguishing between acci-
dent and occupational disease. But this rule does not require that the injury result from a
single specific and definite occurrence, and does not preclude recovery of compensation for
an injury caused by the cumulative effect of a series of minor accidents, each one of which
is specific and ascertainable, although its actual contribution to the resultant injury cannot
be definitely fixed. Neither does the rule require that the time be fixed in all cases with
minute or particular exactness, and in many cases it is sufficient if the approximate time is
determinable.
Id. at 252-53.
139. Edwards, 311 P.2d at 255.
140. This recognition has continued to the present. See Wade Lahar Constr. Co. v. Howell, 376
P.2d 221 (Okla. 1962) (post-traumatic neurosis following a brain concussion and shock); General
Tool & Supply v. Somers, 737 P.2d 581 (Okla. App. 1987) (psychological overlay suffered as a result
of an injury to the claimant's reproductive system caused by a fall on an oily substance).
141. 112 Okla. 101, 240 P. 96 (1925).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 102, 240 P. at 97.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 103, 240 P. at 98. Malingering involves the conscious feigning of a mental injury for
the dual purpose of avoiding work and obtaining compensation. Note, supra note 46, at 736.
146. Rialto, 112 Okla. at 103, 240 P. at 98.
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The court's theory of compensation rested upon the claimant's wage
loss, rather than his physical disability. Compensation awarded for a
mental condition was contingent upon that condition depriving the em-
ployee of working in his former occupation. 147 As such, the court linked
the claimant's mental disability with his inability to earn a living.1 48 This
award of compensation based on a claimant's inability to work, as op-
posed to the severity of his physical injury, was an important step to the
eventual compensation of purely mental injuries.
d. A "'Mental Stimulus" Causing a Compensable Accidental Injury
In 1930, the Oklahoma Supreme Court awarded compensation for
an accidental physical injury resulting from a mental stimulus. In North-
western Refining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 149 the claimant was
working while standing on a ladder. 5 A nearby explosion frightened
the claimant who jumped off the ladder and suffered physical injuries. 11
The employer alleged that the claimant's fright was due to a previous
existing nervous condition for which the employer was not liable.15 2
While the court acknowledged the claimant's nervous disposition, it con-
cluded that the claimant would not have jumped had the explosion not
occurred.153 The court determined that the sudden shock of the explo-
sion caused the claimant to jump from the ladder and awarded compen-
sation because the injury arose out of and during the course of
147. Id.
148. The court reiterated its position by quoting at length from the old English case Eaves v.
Blaenclydach Colliery Co., 2 K.B. 73 (Eng. 1909). In Eaves, the court stated in part that "he has not
wholly recovered from the nervous effects of the accident, which are just as real and just as impor-
tant as the muscular effects and make him unable to work." Id. (emphasis added).
The underlying purpose of workers' comensation was to provide compensation to a worker for
the loss of an opportunity to engage in work when the worker's disability was occasioned by an
injury suffered from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. See Burlington
Mills Corp. v. Hagood 177 Va. 204, -, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941).
Professor Larson believes that the original focus of the earning impairment principle has eroded
and should be restored in workers' compensation. 2 A. LAP.SON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 57.14. For a discussion on the modern disagreement over the theory of disability, and
its relation to Oklahoma Workers' Compensation, see Recent Development, supra note 8, at 429.
149. 145 Okla. 72, 291 P. 533 (1930).
150. Id.
151. Id. Initially the claimant alleged an injury to his back and ankle, and pains in his chest. He
went to the hospital and received treatments. Those bills were paid by his employer. At the Work-
ers' Compensation hearing, no claim was made that the claimant was suffering because of his ankle
or back, as those injuries had been temporary matters which had passed within a short time. How-
ever, the claimant alleged that he was suffering from a pain in his chest and that he was unable to
work. He was sixty-four years of age and had been suffering from hardening of the arteries for a long
time prior to the accident. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court stated the following:
[Vol. 23:461
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employment. 15 4
The principle of compensating an accidental physical injury precipi-
tated by a mental stimulus was reaffirmed in Bill Gover Ford Co. v. Ro-
niger."'5 In Roniger, the claimant was an office worker whose duties
consisted of general clerical work and dealing with customers.1 56 How-
ever, when a co-worker left the office, she was required to do all the work
previously done by the co-worker, in addition to her regular duties.
157
While performing one of these additional duties, the claimant suffered a
heart attack.' 58 Her medical witness testified that the stress and strain
suffered by the claimant was the precipitating factor causing the heart
attack.1
5 9
The mental stress resulting from the claimant's increased work
schedule was causally related to her heart attack. In determining that
the existence of several facts established a causal relationship, 6 ° the
court addressed cases from other jurisdictions that had already held that
a heart disability caused by stress or strain was compensable under
Workers' Compensation.' 6 ' Of particular note is the language quoted
If the explosion had not occurred, he would not have jumped. If he had been stricken by
paralysis or apoplexy and had fallen off of the ladder, then of course we would have a
different question. Here, however, the explosion occurred, and he, being of a nervous dis-
position, became frightened and jumped. We think the explosion was the cause of his
jumping from the ladder, and it is not contended that he was not engaged in the course of




155. 426 P.2d 701 (Okla. 1967).
156. Id. at 702.
157. Id. Mrs. Gover, the wife of Bill Gover, worked in the office about six hours each day and
did the daily posting of the accounts. After Mrs. Gover left, the claimant was required to assume the
duty of posting the accounts. Id.
158. Id. at 702-03. At the time of her heart attack, the claimant was running statements through
a thermofax machine, which was work other than her regular duties and work which had to be done
during the last few days of each month. Id.
159. Id. at 703. The doctor described her stress and strain as being both mental and physical. In
this regard, he testified: "I think it's a combination of mental and physical. When anyone is rushing
about and dealing with a lot of figures and books and papers and answering the telephone and
dealing with customers, there's quite a bit of physical strain to it as well as mental and nervous
strain." Id.
160. Id. at 704-05. The court determined the claimant's heart attack was causally related to her
employment because: (1) for a period of two weeks prior to suffering her heart attack, the claimant
was required to perform new, additional duties; (2) she was "tired" at the end of each workday;
(3) on the day the heart attack occurred, the claimant was performing unfamiliar tasks; (4) before
being required to perform these additional duties, the claimant had been in good health; (5) the
claimant testified that the performance of these additional duties caused her to sustain "a strain, a
different strain;" and (6) her doctor testified that the strain she sustained was both mental and physi-
cal. Id.
161. Roniger, 426 P.2d at 704.
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from the New York case of Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp. 162 where
the court stated in part that "[i]t is settled that an injury caused by emo-
tional stress or strain may be found to be accidental within the contem-
plation of the Workers' Compensation law." 163 Apparently the Roniger
court relied on this language.
By determining that a mental stimulus caused a compensable injury,
both Northwestern and Roniger provide stepping stones toward
Oklahoma's recognition of gradual stress disability. In these decisions,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court confronted the complex causal relation-
ship that exists where the precipitating stimulus depends on the subjec-
tive mental strain of employment rather than on an objective physical
act.164 The Northwestern court concluded that a sudden mental stimulus
caused an accidental personal injury. Thirty-five years later, the court in
Roniger held that gradual mental stress stimulated a heart attack. This
evolution is a significant step to the eventual recognition that a gradual
mental stimulus can result in a mental injury.
e. Everyday Stress as a Mental Stimulus Causing an Accidental Injury
In 1975, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that under certain cir-
cumstances, an accidental injury resulting from the usual, everyday stress
of employment is compensable. In Oklahoma City v. Schoonover,165 the
court broadened its previous decisions in Northwestern 166 and Roniger.167
These earlier decisions recognized the compensability of accidental inju-
ries caused by a mental stimulus. In Northwestern, the mental stimulus
was a sudden shock, whereas in Roniger, the mental stimulus was unu-
sual, gradual stress. In Schoonover, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that the usual stress of certain occupations can result in an accidental
injury, 6 1 This decision has provided yet another step toward the even-
tual compensation of gradual mental injuries reasonably incident to, and
arising out of, the everyday stress of employment.
In Schoonover, the claimant169 alleged that the everyday stress of the
162. 19 A.D.2d 931, 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1963).
163. Roniger, 426 P.2d at 704 (quoting Lobman, 19 A.D.2d at 933, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 427).
164. For a comprehensive discussion of the causal relationship existing in claims for purely
mental injuries see Comment, supra note 5.
165. 535 P.2d 688 (Okla. 1975).
166. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
168. In Schoonover, the court determined that the deceased's occupation as a police officer in-
volved inherent danger creating constant anxiety and apprehensiveness, which resulted in emotional
stress and strain. Schoonover, 535 P.2d at 692. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
169. The claimant was the surviving wife of the deceased police officer. Id. at 689.
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police officer's employment caused the recurrence of a peptic ulcer,
which resulted in death. Prior to entering the police force, the officer had
suffered from a peptic ulcer, but upon his entry into the police force, the
examining physician reported that the officer's ulcer was completely
healed. 70 Evidence indicated that the employment was stressful and suf-
ficient to create anxiety and apprehensiveness. 171 The police officer
sought medical attention and was diagnosed as having a recurrence of
the peptic ulcer.1 72 After several periods of hospitalization, he was again
hospitalized for stomach resection surgery. 173 Although records showed
he tolerated surgery well, he died two days later. 174
The court determined that the deceased's emotional stress was en-
gendered by the working conditions and nature of his employment. The
employment involved inherent danger creating anxiety and apprehen-
siveness, which resulted in emotional stress and strain. 17' Because un-
controverted medical evidence established that the deceased plaintiff's
ulcer was provoked by that constant stress, the ulcer was within the defi-
nition of accidental injury.176 The court agreed with the lower court that
there is no difference between an injury or death caused by physical ex-
ternal violence and an injury caused by mental internal pressure. 177
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion that there is no distinc-
tion between an accidental injury or death resulting from a physical stim-
ulus and an accidental injury or death resulting from a mental stimulus
poses a logical question. If the court recognizes that both physical and
mental stimuli can produce a compensable physical injury, will the court
recognize that both physical and mental stimuli can produce compensa-
ble mental injury?
IV. THE LOGICAL RECOGNITION OF GRADUAL STRESS DISABILITY
UNDER OKLAHOMA'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
Although it is presently unknown whether a purely mental injury is
compensable under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court will probably be required to address this issue
170. Id.
171. Id. After employment began, the police officer experienced physical difficulty evidenced by
nausea and vomiting upon returning home from regular duty. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 690.
174. Id.





Carmody: The Logical Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability under Oklaho
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
in the future. For the court to address the compensability of a gradual
mental injury, however, the appropriate factual circumstances must be
present. These circumstances require the claimant to establish several
factors: (1) that the stress or strain developed gradually; (2) that it devel-
oped during the performance of required employment; (3) that the stress
is causally connected with a resulting mental injury; and (4) that the
mental injury arose from a risk reasonably incident to that employ-
ment.178 In this manner, the claimant would satisfy the statutory re-
quirement of proving an accidental injury "arising out of and in the
course of" employment. 179 If confronted with such circumstances, the
court's award of compensation would be logical. Compensating purely
mental injuries that result from gradual stress of employment is consis-
tent with the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, prior Oklahoma
Supreme Court decisions, and the underlying principles upon which
Workers' Compensation is based.
A. The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act
Compensation of gradual stress disability is consistent with the
Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act. The Act provides compensa-
tion when "an accidental personal injury sustained by the employee
arise[s] out of and in the course of employment."' 180 This language re-
flects the basic purpose of the Act, which is to ensure that industry as-
sumes the burden of personal injuries suffered by workers in the course of
their employment.
The statutory language does not preclude the compensation of
purely mental injuries. In fact, the Act makes no distinction between
physical and mental injuries; it merely requires an "accidental physical
injury." An examination of the statutory definition of "injury or per-
sonal injury"18 reveals that this definition is broad enough to cover a
mental injury, as long as the mental injury arises out of and in the course
of employment, and the source of the mental injury is not purely per-
sonal but is reasonably incident to that employment.
Although the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act contains a
178. These "appropriate factual circumstances" are derived from Novak v. McAlister, 301 P.2d
234 (1956) where the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted the statutory requirement of an acciden-
tal injury "arising from" employment. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
179. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (Supp. 1987). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. OKLA. STAT. tit 85, § 3(7) (Supp. 1987); see supra note 37.
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physical impairment payment schedule,18 2 this schedule does not suggest
a legislative intent to limit compensation to physical injuries. Rather, the
schedule provides an administrative means to effectuate the underlying
purpose of Workers' Compensation which is to compensate impaired
earning ability. 183 Schedules were originally implemented because the se-
verity of a worker's injury supported the presumption that there had
been or would be an actual wage loss. 184 The purpose of the schedule
was to prevent litigation because a claimant's loss would be conspicuous,
and the amount of compensation would be certain.185 While the use of
the schedule has expanded over the years, the schedule cannot be sepa-
rated from the underlying "wage loss" policy supporting it; otherwise,
workers' compensation merely becomes an insurance policy for loss of
limbs. In addition, the schedule does not provide an exclusive list of
compensable injuries. The nonexclusivity of the schedule is underscored
by Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions sustaining compensation for
mental injuries resulting from accidental physical injuries.186
The Oklahoma Legislature sets Oklahoma Workers' Compensation
policy, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court interprets this legislative in-
tent. Therefore, only the legislature has the authority to make changes in
the provisions that delineate the type of injuries that are compensable
under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act. However, even after
Oklahoma courts have awarded compensation for mental injuries result-
ing from accompanying physical injuries, the Oklahoma Legislature has
not seen fit, by amending the Act, to restrict the meaning of accidental
injury to cover only physical injuries. On the contrary, the Legislature
has chosen to treat work-related injuries as a cost of production to be
borne by industry and, ultimately, through the consumption process, by
the community in general.
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court Decisions
Compensation of gradual stress disability is consistent with prior
182. A schedule is a "list describing various members of the body, and prescribing a fixed
number of weeks of compensation for their loss or loss of use." 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.14(c) (1987). See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 22 (Supp. 1987). For exam-
ple, the schedule for permanent partial disability lists compensation of two-thirds of a worker's
average weekly wages to be paid to claimant for thirty-five weeks for the loss of a first finger, for ten
weeks for the loss of a toe other than the great toe, and for fourteen weeks for a hernia. Recent
Development, supra note 8, at 429.
183. See Recent Development, supra note 8, at 429.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 139.
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Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions. Vernon and Daugherty are the only
cases where claims for gradual mental injuries were unaccompanied by
related physical injuries. Because of the particular facts of those cases,
however, the court did not rule on the compensability of purely mental
injuries.187 As such, the court has never held that a gradual stress disa-
bility arising out of and in the course of employment is not compensable.
Thus, without a barrier precluding compensation, perhaps the start-
ing point toward the recognition of gradual stress disability is Justice
Berry's special concurring opinion in Keeling.'88 According to Justice
Berry, if a mental injury could be found to have actually resulted from
the particular employment, it could be compensable.18 9 He apparently
rejected the historical equation of mental with "unreal" or "imaginary"
and recognized that although the various causes of mental illness are
often speculative, the developing sophistication of psychiatry has reduced
the difficulty of determining whether a mental stimulus is the cause of a
mental injury. However, he stated that competent evidence was needed
to remove speculation as to the cause of the mental injury. 9 ' His accept-
ance of the view that a mental injury may constitute an "accidental in-
jury" allowed him to proceed with the key issue of whether the
claimant's mental injury (nervous breakdown) was causally related to her
employment so as to warrant imposing liability on her employer. Under
the factual circumstances of Keeling, however, Justice Berry agreed with
the court's majority, and determined that the claimant did not establish
that her nervous breakdown was causally related to her employment. 91
Consistent with Justice Berry's concurring opinion in Keeling, many
other Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions provide stepping stones to-
ward the recognition that a gradual mental stress can cause a compensa-
ble mental injury. In a series of cases from 1925 to the present,
Oklahoma courts have held that mental injuries that develop from ac-
companying accidental physical injuries are compensable.192 Since 1930,
several Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions have compensated claimants
for physical disabilities that have resulted from work-related mental
187. See supra notes 51-59, 66-71 and accompanying text.





192. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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stimuli. 193 In addition, another line of Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
sions provides that an "accidental injury" does not have to be attributa-
ble to one particular event, but that it may arise progressively from the
cumulative effect of a series of events. 194
Thus, prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions have established
that a mental injury is an "accidental injury" within the meaning of the
Act, and that physical injuries resulting from work-related emotional
stress are compensable. If both physical injuries leading to mental inju-
ries, and mental stress leading to physical injuries are compensable, it
follows that emotional stress leading to mental injuries is compensable
within the Act. Therefore, it appears that under the appropriate factual
circumstances, 195 a purely mental injury that results from the gradual
stress of employment logically constitutes a compensable "accidental in-
jury" within the meaning of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act.
C. Workers' Compensation Policy
Compensation of gradual stress disability is consistent with the un-
derlying principles upon which workers' compensation is based. These
principles include: (1) the presumption of compensability; (2) the prem-
ise that an employer takes the employee "as he finds him"; (3) the princi-
ple that workers' compensation benefits are not awarded for the injury as
such, but rather for the loss of earning capacity; and (4) the principle that
business and industry should bear the burden of economic loss resulting
from the injuries of workers.
1. Presumption of Compensability
Although a claimant has the burden of establishing an accidental
injury within the Act, Oklahoma Workers' Compensation law presumes
that a worker's claim for injury comes within the provisions of the Act,
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary.1 96 In addition, any
reasonable doubt is to be resolved in favor of the claimant.' This pre-
sumption was illustrated in Andrews, 98 where the Oklahoma Supreme
Court clarified its commitment to a broad and liberal construction of the
193. See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
196. In re Death of May, 586 P.2d 738, 740 (Okla. 1978).
197. Id. (citing In re Martin, 452 P.2d 785 (Okla. 1969); Nebo Oil Co. v. Wright, 406 P.2d 266
(Okla. 1965)).
198. Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 192 Okla. 322, 323, 135 P.2d 960, 961 (1943).
See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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term "accidental injury," with a view of compensating injured employees
where disabilities result from compensable personal injuries. 199 Because
the definition of "personal injury" is broad enough to include mental in-
juries,2" the benefit of the presumption of compensability is obvious. A
mental injury arising out of and in the course of employment is presumed
to constitute an accidental personal injury within the Oklahoma Work-
ers' Compensation Act.
2. An Employer Takes An Employee "As He Finds Him"
Workers' compensation law generally protects the "eggshell skull"
plaintiff, a worker who is more predisposed to injury than the average
worker.20 1 Under this principle, a worker predisposed to mental reac-
tions from stress should not be denied workers' compensation any more
than a worker predisposed to certain physical injuries. The fact that an
average worker might not experience any ill effects from the same stress
should be irrelevant. °2 However, if purely mental injuries that result
from the gradual stress of employment are not compensated, these "egg-
shell" employees will not be compensated for injuries because the stress
to which this type of claimant succumbed was stress which would not
overcome the average worker.
3. Impaired Earning Capacity
The underlying purpose of workers' compensation is to provide
compensation to a worker for the loss of his opportunity to engage in
work when his disability is the result of an accidental injury arising out of
and in the course of employment.2 °3 Benefits are not awarded for the
199. Andrews, 192 Okla. at 323, 135 P.2d at 961.
200. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
201. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.21 (1985); see Kelly's Case,
17 Mass. App. Ct. 727,-, 462 N.E.2d 348, 350 (1984) (the employer must take the worker with his
existing disabilities), aff'd, 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582 (1985); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry,
Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 55-56, 95 A.2d 446, 448, aff'd per curiam, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604
(1953) (the inherent perplexities of the claimant cannot defeat compensation where the requisite
standard of proof has otherwise been met).
202. See Comment, supra note 5, at 861. The New York Court of Appeals stated:
[Tihere is nothing in the nature of a stress or shock situation which ordains physical as
opposed to psychological injury. The determinative factor is the particular vulnerability of
an indiviudal by virtue of his physical makeup. In a given situation one person may be
susceptible to a heart attack while another may suffer a depressive reaction. In either case
the result is the same-the individual is incapable of functioning properly because of an
accident and should be compensated under the Workmen's Compensaton Law.
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603, 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637,
641 (1975).
203. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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injury as such, but rather for the loss of earning capacity. Under this
principle, no logical basis distinguishes a physical injury that impairs a
worker's earning capacity from a mental injury that impairs a worker's
earning capacity. 2°4
In today's highly competitive world, undoubtedly people often are
affected by mental pressures resulting from their employment. 20 5 These
disabilities are just as costly to the production process as physical inju-
ries. The humanitarian goals of the Workers' Compensation Act require
that indemnification be based not upon the label assigned to the injury
received but upon the employee's inability to work because of disabilities
flowing from his employment.
Court's apparently justify the denial of compensation for purely
mental injuries because they are easier to feign than physical injuries.
However, this justification is unsubstantiated. No evidence shows that it
will be easier to feign or more difficult to detect complex patterns of psy-
choneurotic reactions than certain "physical" injuries. 2 6 The important
question under workers' compensation law should be whether the injury
arose out of and occurred in the course of employment. 20 7 To operate in
an unbiased manner, the workers' compensation system must serve as a
potential source of protection for all workers, regardless of the manner in
which their injuries develop.208
204. It has been stated that "[tihe recurring demand for 'something physical or extraordinary' in
workers' compensation cases involving mental and nervous injury results, absent a statutory require-
ment, from misapplication of tort principles that permit recovery for negligently inflicted mental
distress only upon proof of a physical impact." Note, Workers' Compensation For Mental Disabilities
Resulting from Protracted Stress, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 693, 696 (1981).
205. Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 38, 487
P.2d 278, 282 (1971).
206. Comment, supra note 25, at 1137; see lB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.23(a). Professor
Larson states that:
[Trhere is no really valid distinction between physical and "nervous" injury. Certainly
modem medical opinion would support this view, and insist that it is no longer realistic to
draw a line between what is "nervous" and what is "physical." It is an old story, in the
history of law, to observe legal theory constantly adapting itself to accommodate new ad-
vances and knowledge in medical theory. Perhaps, in earlier years, when much less was
known about mental and nervous injuries and their relation to "physical" symptoms and
behavior, there was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for ruling out recov-
eries based on such injuries, both in tort and workmen's compensation. But the excuse no
longer exists.
Id.
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4. Economic Burden To Be Borne by Industry
Another basic principle of workers' compensation is to burden busi-
ness and industry with the economic loss resulting from the workers'
injuries."' The cost is then passed on to the consumer in the form of
higher prices. If work-related injuries are not compensated, this princi-
ple will be frustrated because private insurers will be forced to pay medi-
cal bills for work-related injuries.210 As a result, this burden will be
shifted from industry to the subscribers of private health programs.211
Cognizant of the present economic conditions in Oklahoma, com-
pensation of purely mental injuries would be a costly burden to
Oklahoma employers, small and large, who compete with out-of-state
businesses. Compensation would also be costly to the consumers who
absorb these costs. The concern, however, is not for employers and con-
sumers, but for injured employees. Prior to their injuries, the employees
were contributing members of the work force. 12 Instead of relying on
charity, these people should receive workers' compensation if their disa-
bility was work-related.213
V. CONCLUSION
Compensation of purely mental injuries resulting from the gradual
stress of employment is consistent with the Oklahoma Worker's Com-
pensation Act, prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions, the underlying
principles upon which workers' compensation is based, and the national
trend toward compensating this disability. The Oklahoma Workers'
Compensation Act provides compensation for an "accidental personal
injury" and makes no distinction between a physical and mental injury.
Although prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions have not addressed
the compensability of gradual stress claims, other decisions represent the
"stepping stones" toward the court's ultimate compensation of gradual
stress disability. The underlying principle supporting workers' compen-
sation mandates that compensation be awarded for an employee's work-
related injury which impairs earning capacity, without regard to the label
of that injury. In addition, a growing number of American jurisdictions
209. Note, Workers' Compensation: Recovery for Psychological Disability Caused by Work-Re-
lated Stress: Lockwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 877, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1194, 1204 (1982).
210. Id.
211. Id.





Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/4
1988] GRADUAL STRESS DISABILITY 493
have compensated claims for gradual stress disability when confronted
with the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's eventual compensation of gradual stress disability will be logical.
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